000			02077cam a2200277 i 4500
001			18388935
003			BT-JSWLaw
005			20250426235927.0
008			141128t20152015nyua b 001 0 eng c
020			_a9781107677265
040			_aBT-JSWLaw _beng _cBT-JSWLaw _dBT-JSWLaw _erda
082			_223 _a341.55 _bC237i
100	1		_aCarrubba, Clifford J. _eAuthor. _93690
245	1	0	_aInternational courts and the performance of international agreements : _ba general theory with evidence from the European Union / _cClifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel.
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cc2015.
300			_aviii, 243 p. : _bill. ; _c23 cm.
490	1		_aComparative constitutional law and policy
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index (p 220-243)
520	8		_aNations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions-- _cSource other than Library of Congress.
650		0	_aInternational courts. _93463
650		0	_aInternational relations. _93239
651		0	_aEuropean Union countries _xForeign relations. _93691
700	1		_aGabel, Matthew J. _eAuthor. _93692
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c1017 _d1017